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 Abstract
This thesis tests the prevailing theory in political behavior that Millennial citi-
zens in the United States substitute alternative political behaviors for voting in
order to fill their need for civic engagement. Using  Youth and Participatory
Politics Survey Project Wave  data [n=] of people in America aged -,
analysis of youth behaviors and attitudes is conducted via Logistic Regression
and Ordinal Logistic Regression. Among older respondents, findings are sur-
prising: most concepts tested are either neutral, in the case of boycotts, protests,
online groups, and web-based petitions, or demonstrate relationships in the op-
posite of the direction theory suggests, in the case of paper petition signing and
social media activism. Only a catch-all ‘other event’ behaves as expected based
on the theory and is significantly negative. Among younger respondents, online
political groups are positively associated with likelihood of voting, but no other
results are significant. This provides support for the idea that formal and infor-
mal political behaviors, at least among the younger members of the Millennial
Generation, are more likely to occur together than to substitute for one another.
Additionally, a confirmatory factor analysis is conducted to determine how valid
the formal-informal divide among political behaviors is, with mixed and incon-
clusive results that suggest the concept needs further development.
Keywords: United States, Millennials, Political Behavior, Participatory Poli-
tics, Voting Behavior, Parents, Logistic Regression, Ordinal Logistic Regression,
Factor Analysis, Confirmatory Factor Analysis
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 Introduction
Young people in America are a source of great interest and study in the social
sciences and beyond. At times, America’s youth are condemned, praised, and
pitied in equal measure. Whatever the case may be, they represent a massive
and meaningful portion of the American public. Case in point, the Millennial
Generation—those “aged  to  in ”—now constitute the largest living
bloc of voting-age citizens in the United States (Fry ). As a result, they have
a tremendous amount of potential to affect political outcomes and systems in the
United States. They must be taken seriously and examined to consider how they
interact with politics and, importantly, how they might not interact with politics.
Political participation among young people has always been a source of crit-
icism and analysis. In , youth voter turnout was  percent below the gen-
eral voter turnout (Strama ). Recently, the youth (-) vote increased from
% in  to % in  (Wicks et al. ). The spike in youth participation
in  was impacted largely by the active campaign efforts of Barack Obama,
whose youth outreach was well documented, but the gains quickly plateaued.
In the  and  Presidential elections, turnout was %, stalled since the
high of  and still not up to the % value for the general population (CIR-
CLE ). Midterm turnout among the - year old demographic, as follows
a historical trend, is even worse in recent years—% in , and .% in ,
the lowest in  years.

These numbers paint a picture of politics in which fewer youth participate in
politics than older citizens. % of Millennials surveyed by the Associated Press
claimed to consume news frequently, with half of those respondents doing so
multiple times a day (AP ). In-depth study of modern younger generations
has revealed they have a strong desire for civic engagement (Dalton ). The
generation of the information age has embraced the wealth of stories they are
awash with, and political news is no different. Youth discuss politics on social
media constantly (Cohen and Kahne ). The disconnect between a seemingly
active, engaged young generation and their lack of measurable, formalized polit-
ical participation is worthy of discussion and examination.
Healthy, active, representative democratic systems of government depend on
citizen participation. When a major part of the population participates less than
the national average, voting outcomes and policy outcomes are likely to poorly
reflect the actual population of citizens. It is imperative to understand the roots
of the phenomenon to accurately define the nature of participation among mod-
ern American youth. A sharper definition of the bounds of Millennial partici-
pation could enhance not only the study of politics, but efforts on the part of
politicians and activist networks to capture and engage the younger generations
of Americans and preserve the practice of democracy in the United States. This
research will attempt to examine what relationship exists between different po-
litical and civic behaviors among Millennial youth in the United States.
Emerging study suggests that young Americans’ definition of political en-

gagement is changing (Dalton ), and they they substitute newer behaviors
for ’formal’ behaviors like voting and running for office. Meanwhile, a competing
body of literature sees political behaviors, formal or otherwise, as mostly harmo-
nious, building on one another and creating individuals who are more engaged
generally.
Within this thesis, I take data of Millennial political behaviors, both formal
and informal, and examine the effect their presence has on voting behavior. Pur-
suant to a theory in the literature that suggests Millennials substitute activism
and civic activity for formal political behaviors, I use logistic regression and or-
dinal logistic regression to test the likelihood of formal and informal behaviors
coexisting, and find that in many cases the two are not meaningfully connected,
and where they are, the two coexist rather than crowd each other out. Addi-
tionally, I attempt a confirmatory factor analysis to examine the idea of the for-
mal/informal divide itself, with inconclusive results.
 Background
Political participation is a complex topic in its own right, and many in the dis-
cipline have made efforts to define it over time. Perhaps the most enduring is
“those activities by private citizens that are more or less aimed at influencing the
selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take,” as presented by
Milbrath and expanded on by Verba (Verba and Nie ; Milbrath ). This

definition has been explored and expanded upon over time, such as by the efforts
of Van Deth et al. (), who expanded this definition to include political efforts
beyond simply those targeting government personnel, such as “corporate actors
within the non-profit or private sector” to pursue political ends (Deth, Montero,
and Westholm ).
Dalton () has recently pushed a definition of political participation among
modern youth that extends beyond the traditional. Building on the classic con-
struction of ‘duty-based citizenship,’ where citizens engage in their participatory
duty and stress loyalty, and ‘engaged citizenship,’ which “includes direct-action
and elite challenging activities” to ”express policy preferences,” Dalton suggests
that “Americans are changing the way they choose to participate” (Dalton ).
He explains that “changing skills and norms encourage Americans to engage in
more demanding and more assertive means of political participation.” This in-
cludes voting, like the old perspective, but expands to include group participa-
tion and social activities related to politics as well. Study of political participa-
tion extends far beyond simply defining it, however, and a number of different
approaches have tackled the subject over time.
. Rational Choice and Political Participation
Another well-explored corpus of literature in the study of political participation
is that of the rational choice perspective, whose authors attempt to construct

logical, clear models in order to break down the seemingly illogical imbalance
of effort to reward inherent to voting in large-scale elections. Among them was
Anthony Downs, among the first to introduce the rational choice approach to
the study of political participation and turnout (Downs ). From this starting
point, the study branched out and evolved through the work of scholars like John
Aldrich, who expanded the rational perspective and addressed the paradoxical
irrationality of individual voting, whose small tangible rewards might at first
glance discount the rational choice model (Aldrich ). More recently, authors
like Brady and McNulty have examined the real, logistical barriers to voting, such
as inconvenient polling place locations and troubles of getting away from work
to vote, all as a part of a rational-choice calculus of voting (Brady and McNulty
).
The rational choice literature is not without its limitations, however. Espe-
cially limiting among rational choice conceptions of behavior are assumptions
about the completeness of participant information and the ability of participants
to efficiently pursue their exact best interests. Beyond the rational choice per-
spective, however, is a trove of literature more interested in who people are than
their potential internal thought process.

. Demographics and Political Participation
In , Wolfinger and Rosenstone laid a groundwork of what types of people
voted more or less–generally, older and better educated people vote more often
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone ). Later efforts with access to better data would
help to confirm their findings and expand the concept of ’life transitions’ that
drive these age differences in voting (Highton and Wolfinger ). These life
transitions drove the narrative of a citizen that grows more participatory in poli-
tics as they age, gather life experiences, and lock down other life priorities, such
as finding a partner and a reliable source of income. “Politics,” they claim, is
“rarely a top priority for anyone” (Leighly and Naegler ). The Millennial
generation seems to buck this trend, showing high levels of political attention
and previously unprecedented levels of political information (Lawless and Fox
). Dalton () likewise rebukes this, describing how political behavior in
the United States has long been active and engaged, and has changed over time to
keep up with modern technology and social conventions (Dalton ). Millen-
nials care about politics and have strong opinions, yet their lack of participation
through voting remains evident.
A rich literature exists which has considered the effects of gender (Karp and
Banducci ) and race (Fraga ) in electoral politics, considering not only
the effects of candidates belonging to underrepresented groups, but also of the
various unique social and economic forces which affect citizens belonging to

those groups. Women tend to vote slightly more often than men, and respond
well to information and recruitment, while racial minorities vote less on average
but are extremely receptive to efforts which reach out to them.
Much emphasis in the discipline has also examined the significance of educa-
tion (Sondheimer and Green ; Berinski and Lenz ) and income (Rosen-
stone ; Leighley and Nagler ), discovering them to be powerful compo-
nents of electoral behavior and general political engagement.
. American Political Participation
The study of political engagement among Americans is a long-standing tradition
in political science. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse examined political attitudes and
found that Americans largely want to be uninvolved in the running of govern-
ment as much as possible, only becoming committed when they do not trust
specific politicians (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse ). Sydney Verba and Kay
Schlozman, meanwhile, proposed an America of civic-minded people who en-
gage in politics just as they engage in their local communities, homes, and con-
gregations (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady ). Their America, in the tradition
of Tocqueville, is filled with concerned citizens, but those same citizens’ ideas
of what participation is extends beyond the most structured paradigms of polit-
ical engagement to more communal and social activities. Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady expand on these ideas more recently, developing the idea of how social and

civic groups build a set of “civic skills” among citizens (Schlozman, Verba, and
Brady ).
The study of American politics will forever be a tug of war between different
conceptions of how Americans structure their lives, values, and ideals, and the
literature reflects that. Beyond the broad study of America, however, is a tight,
detail-rich contingent of study focused on America’s youth.
. Youth & Politics
Historically, participation among young people has never been outstanding. Cen-
sus data shows that youth voter turnout has hovered between % and %,
consistently much lower than each older age group. (U.S. ) Nevertheless,
typical participation literature paid little mind to youth at first. Instead, much
of the earliest work done on youth and politics came from the psychology and
sociology literature on socialization and development. Herbert Hyman and Con-
stance Flanagan both examined the process of political socialization from a young
age, determining a theory of how people learn political behaviors throughout the
development process, from parents, educators, and general societal observation
(Hyman ; Flanagan ). Much of the rest of the literature about youth
and politics examines distinctly modern influences and factors, from the -hour
news cycle (Kahne and Middaugh ) to social media and beyond (Auskalinien
). Another growing contingent of youth research examines youth behaviors

generally, such as school extracurricular activities (McNeal ; Hayes )
and volunteerism (Fisher ) in a political context. The findings, expanded
upon in depth by Dalton (), suggest that youth in the modern day may not
follow historical trends and become more involved as they age. Instead, cynicism
may rule the day (Dalton ).
Putnam () described an American public slowly isolating themselves from
one another, disengaging from politics alongside social groups (Putnam ).Put-
nam’s core thesis is that close, personal associations between citizens are on the
decline, even as larger “tertiary” civic activist groups are on the rise. Putnam val-
ued close, neighborly citizen associations, and saw their decline as closely linked
to declining political participation. These effects were strongest among younger
generations.
A final recent pursuit in the study of youth and politics examines what ap-
pears to be a declining trend in youth candidate emergence, which is leading to
a slowly aging pool of elected officials (Lawless and Fox ). Their work links
traditional candidate emergence literature with the findings of much of the other
youth and politics literature: politics leaves a bad taste in the mouths of young
people, and they have largely withdrawn from it.

 Theory
The theory at work in this thesis focuses primarily on the topics of political par-
ticipation and the study of young people, both their attitudes and their actions.
. Political Participation
Broadly, political engagement, or political participation, can be understood as
idea of ‘any action’ to try and influence government, either through elected of-
ficials or more directly as a citizen (Verba and Nie ; Deth, Montero, and
Westholm ). Political participation is most obvious in its most visible for-
mal construction–voting. However, it can be understood to also include “any ac-
tion oriented to influence the formal political system,” from “writing to political
representatives, working for political parties or candidates, attending public de-
bates or meetings over policy or issues” to “involvement in social movements or
protests” (Wicks et al. ). Calareso () supports this idea, adding a clearer
distinction between “formal” and “informal” political behaviors, delineating a
divide between them (Calareso ). Formal participation is composed of vot-
ing, attending official political rallies, and any direct interaction with a political
campaign, from working on it to donating to running for office itself. Informal
participation, meanwhile, includes volunteerism, social group activity, protests,
and other activities well separated from the ‘official’ workings of political sys-
tems. These divisions have much basis within the specific body of this literature,

but few studies directly test these concepts and whether they align in actual fact
the way theory suggests they do. There is an opportunity within this uncertainty
for additional research.
The divide between formal and informal political engagement is especially
important in the discussion of Millennial voters. A prevailing theory about youth
engagement in politics is that modern youth have eschewed formal political be-
haviors in favor of these alternatives.
. Roots of Youth Political Behavior
There is no clear understanding of who or what most strongly influences to youth
political behavior. Instead, the literature examines a number of different poten-
tial influential factors individually. From a logistical standpoint, young people
often change residences more often than do older citizens, limiting their interac-
tion with local issues and hurting their opportunities to develop political habits
(Strama ). Voting is largely habitual, and those habits are harder to form
among youth when they are frequently displaced (Fowler ). Additionally,
“structural barriers” within the registration and voting apparatus particularly af-
fect young people, such as inconvenient polling places and archaic, paper-based
registration processes that are designed with older generations in mind (Strama
). These issues compound on each other: “politicians ignore young people
because they dont vote, and young people dont vote because politicians ignore

them” (Strama ).
A number of other influential factors emerge in the literature about youth po-
litical participation. The parents of Millennials have a significant impact on their
political development (Serek and Macek ). Interaction with parents in early
adulthood also seems to inspire political thought and action that goes beyond
socialization (Fitzgerald and Curtis ). Moreover, if voting literature is to be
believed, even simple reminders to vote that draw attention to the election can
have the potential to improve voting behavior (Dale and Strauss ). Ethnic-
ity also seems to have as much or more of an effect on youth behavior as it does
on adult political behavior, with reduced participation generally but strong pos-
itive effects when they are directly appealed to by campaigns and representative
candidates (McNeal ).
. Youth Disengagement
Young people do not hold politics in high regard. They feel “apathetic, unin-
formed, distrustful, and disempowered” in the world of politics (Snell ).
These attitudes reflect a fundamental disconnect between our current political
systems and the values, ideals, and paradigms of thought that Millennials hold.
Distrust and powerlessness specifically are characteristics of citizens who “ac-
tually seem to be more informed and interested in politics” but who “do not think
it is possible to rely on others in the political realm” or who “do not believe that

they as an individual can affect change in the broader political system,” respec-
tively (Snell ). Millennials withdraw from politics, considering the entire
enterprise more trouble than any benefit they could gain in it (Lawless and Fox
).
There is dispute within the literature about Millennials and formal politi-
cal behavior. Much of the literature suggests a world in which Millennials are
not uninterested or uninvolved in politics, but instead engage with it differently.
This literature posits that young people engage in alternative political behaviors–
activism and civic activities–that supplant the role of formal political behaviors
like voting and running for office (Lawless and Fox ). Civic engagement, like
“volunteer and service activities geared to helping others and creating a good so-
ciety,” are distinct from political behaviors and activism, such as protests, boy-
cotts, and social media efforts, but both can act as “substitute[s] for voting and
other forms of political participation” among young citizens (Wicks et al. ,
Strama ). And, while youth engage in their informal efforts, formalized pol-
itics continues without them, often to their detriment (Fisher , Harris, Wyn,
and Younes ).
However, a body of sociological research suggests that civic participation might
have valuable educating and socializing influences which contribute to greater
formalized political behavior (Flanagan ). This research, born of the devel-
opmental literature, presents a narrative where engagement in informal behavior—
through social groups and civic activities—helps to slowly build young people

towards formal behavior, with the two working in tandem among engaged indi-
viduals, rather than the idea that individuals have a set amount of engagement
to spend on either formal or informal behaviors.
This conflict represents and opportunity for additional research to develop
study of Millennial behavior and provide support for one side or the other. This
thesis will examine data about youth political behavior and provide support for
one side of this argument or the other, situating it within the literature of youth
participation and political behavior. Additionally, this thesis will test the cred-
ibility of the claim that there are theoretical divisions between ‘formal’ and ‘in-
formal’ political behaviors.
 Hypotheses
Based on the sometimes divisive but substantial body of theory in the literature,
a few core expectations, mostly intuitive in their own right, appear and will drive
investigation in this study.
Hypothesis a Voting behavior among Millennials will have a negative relationship
with instances of ‘alternative’ political behavior. Alternative behaviors will reduce the
likelihood of voting.
Based on the theory, this hypothesis follows the dominant narrative that young
people actively substitute the ‘alternative’ behaviors for formal ones. Impor-
tantly, the theory suggests that the relationship is directional: when one in-
creases, it should crowd out the other, reducing it. Alternatively, the competing

sociological literature suggests that the two contribute to one another, inspiring
an alternative hypothesis:
Hypothesis b Voting behavior among Millennials will be positively related to all or
at least most other political behaviors. Individuals who are more involved and active
share their attention rather than selecting on formal or informal behaviors.
Additionally, in order to test the validity of the conceptual divide between ‘for-
mal’ and ‘informal’ political behaviors, I produce another hypothesis to test:
Hypothesis  When examined, the set of political attitudes will divide into two dis-
tinct latent factors, one for formal behaviors and one for informal behaviors.
This hypothesis is born of the theory’s prevailing division in types of political
behavior. The division is commonly accepted, but few works attempt to fully
justify how and why the distinction between them is as described, beyond a logi-
cal thought exercise. Ideally, the data analysis will support the body of the theory
and produce a model with two reasonably distinct factors which the set of vari-
ables neatly divide into.
 Methods
Any model testing the theory of formal versus informal political engagement
among youth requires a focus on the target demographic, a slew of variables for
behavior, as many attitudes as possible to supplement the behavioral data, and
a statistical process that can assign directional correlations between formal and

informal behaviors. To this end, I selected a dataset of Millennials which focused
on behavior, had a good mix of theoretically ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ behaviors,
and I applied a statistical method which would hopefully examine the direction
and intensity of their relationship.
. Data Selection
To properly test whether alternative political behaviors seem to be substituting
for formalized ones among Millennials required a dataset with a few key compo-
nents. It needed to suitably measure a wide range of political behaviors, at least
a few of them formal and several informal. It also needed to survey my specific
age group of interest. Fortunately, the Youth and Participatory Politics  poll
suited my needs. Conducted under the supervision of researchers Cathy Cohen
(University of Chicago) and Joseph Kahne (University of California, Riverside),
YPP surveyed individuals belonging to the correct age range and, importantly,
asked a wide swath of behavioral questions, including both formal and informal
political behaviors. The data was provided to me upon request via their website.
The survey was conducted via computer in the early months of . Laptops
were provided for respondents who did not have access to a suitable computer
themselves. Respondents were all aged between  and , putting them in the
younger side of the Millennial generation, but still within the bound of my in-
Cohen and Kahne , https://ypp.dmlcentral.net/projects/youth-participatory-politics-
survey-project

terest. The final count of respondents was , for the first wave of data, which
has been made publicly available upon request. Two more waves were conducted
in  and , but their data has yet to be released. The survey oversampled
minority groups to establish a solid demographic baseline. In the case of the un-
derage respondents, detailed consent forms and parent permission were applied
in order to avoid any mishandling of humans subjects. While not perfect, the
survey provided the right data to approach this topic and test my hypotheses.
The primary drawbacks of the survey for this study do not fundamentally
compromise the data, but should not go unmentioned. First of all, the survey
was designed in such a way that the questions which involved an answer scale
did not include a middle, neutral option. This forces respondents to pick a side
even if they do not feel strongly about their answer. While most of the vari-
ables significant to the study are simple - dummy variables, the few that are
scaled, including the version of my dependent variable for the youngest respon-
dents, suffer from this potentially confounding weakness. Secondly, the group of
respondents, while all within the Millennial population, represent the younger
side of the total population, those aged - in , and thus prevents general-
ization to the generally accepted definition of Millennial Generation within this
study, those who would at the time be aged -. Finally, the data is drawn from
the  election, a midterm election, which are already characterized by poor
voter turnout among younger voters, and which are known to show other dis-
tinctions from Presidential elections. This issue does not prevent the data from

being descriptively useful, but should be understood to reduce generalizability
to Presidential election years.
. Concepts & Variables
This dataset is useful for the core concepts of this research because it has a large
amount of political behaviors. A combined descriptive table of all model vari-
ables is available in Appendix A-.
.. Dependent Variables: Voting Behavior
The dependent variable is split in half based on the age of respondents. Respon-
dents old enough to have voted in the  election were asked to report whether
or not they voted. If a respondent was too young, they were asked to rate on a
scale of - how likely they are to vote often once they are able to. These two vari-
ables act as the core dependent variables of formal political participation around
which I construct my models.

Figure : Millennial Voting,  Election & Chance of Voting Once  Years Old
Displayed are two barplots representing counts of responses to the two dependent variables,
voting in  and likelihood of voting once coming of age. N = , & , respectively.
Table : Dependent Variables
N Mean SD Min Max Skew Kurtosis SE
2010 Vote 2081 0.42 0.49 0 1 0.32 -1.9 0.01
Vote When 18 820 3.16 0.86 1 4 -0.98 0.49 0.03
The difference between the purported likelihood to vote and actual voting
behavior is worthy of note here. A possible explanation is a ‘social desirability
bias’ in voting, where respondents, no matter their age, are more likely to claim
they are going to vote out of a perception of civic responsibility than to actually
vote (Holbrook and Krosnick , Karp and Brockington ). Yet another
explanation could be that, as  was a midterm election, historically associated
with lower youth turnout, that the younger respondents are prepared to vote in

a Presidential election, but older respondents were not especially motivated to
vote in the  midterm specifically (CIRCLE ). Additionally, the disparity
could be due to simple optimism on the part of younger people who have not
yet encountered the actual physical hurdles associated with voting, which are by
no means insignificant (Strama ). This uncertainty, as well as the distance
between purported voting behavior and actual voting behavior, should temper
expectations of this variable.
.. Independent Variables: Alternative Political Behaviors
The theoretically important ‘alternative’ informal political behaviors and the core
independent variables of this study are represented by the following behaviors–
signing paper petitions, signing web petitions, political discussion on social me-
dia, participation in a boycott, participation in a protest, participation in a specif-
ically political online group, and participation in any ‘other’ kind of political
event–that is an event where people express their political views. Examples of
such an ‘other’ political event given within the questionnaire included “concert”
and “poetry slam” (Cohen and Kahne ). Respondents were asked to answer
all of these questions based on their behavior in the past  months, during the
 election cycle’s climax.

.. Additional Independent Variables: Political Attitudes
I also included three attitudinal variables–perceived political self-competence,
interest in politics, and political optimism. These variables are unique in that
they are measured via a - scale and are not a direct account of behavior. In-
stead, they test several theoretically important conceptual attitudes. Each of
these is coded so that higher values equate to higher levels of competence, in-
terest, and optimism, respectively.
.. Model Testing Variables: Other Formal Political Behaviors
A number of different variables act as additional stand-ins for formal political
behavior according to the theory–attending political rallies, working on political
campaigns, and wearing political buttons or posting political signs. Respondents
were asked to report their participation in these events within the past  months
at time of asking. These concepts are mostly included in the model to add validity
to the measure and attempt to distinguish a difference in effect between ’formal’
and ’informal’ behaviors. It is unreasonable to expect these behaviors to occur too
frequently among Millennials, but their relationship to voting behavior should
provide diagnostic power to the model.
Measured via agreement/disagreement to the statement “I consider myself well qualified to
participate in politics,” coded as normal.
Measured via their stated frequency of face-to-face poltiical discussion.
Measured via agreement/disagreement to the statement “Public officials dont care very much
about what people like me think,” coding reversed.

.. Controls
Finally, I added a set of control variables–gender, ethnicity (broken down into
White, Black, and Hispanic), respondent perception of parental political involve-
ment, education, and income.
. Model Selection & Methods
Because of the nature of the dependent variables, I selected logistic regression,
or logit, as the primary statistical method to examine the relationship between
formal and ‘alternative’ political behavior. For the first dependent variable, the
binary - voting behavior measurement, basic logit was ideal. I estimated the
model and produced a dot-whisker plot of log-likelihoods for each variable, di-
vided into categories for ease of reading. Following this, I simulated predicted
probabilities for the ‘alternative’ behaviors , times and graphed them to
improve comprehension of results.
For the second, ordinal dependent variable, I applied ordinal logistic regres-
sion, which applies a different mechanism in order to predict behavior for mul-
tilevel ordinal variables. I produced another dot-whisker plot for the results of
this model.
Based on the structure of the dependent variables, I estimate logit and ordi-
nal logit of the respective dependent variables against the arrays of behaviors,

attitudes, and controls previously outlined. From these models, I extract logged
odds of voting outcomes and the effects each other attitude’s presence has on
those odds. To ease readability, I organized the results into dot-whisker plots
showing the coefficients and standard errors for each concept, divided into con-
ceptual categories.
Finally, as an additional diagnostic to examine the concepts of ‘formal’ and
‘informal’ political behavior, as they appear in the literature, I needed a method
that could take variables within data and arrange them along latent factors, en-
abling them to be examined as belonging more or less to some grouped concepts.
To test the idea that there is a stark distinction between formal and informal po-
litical behaviors, I selected confirmatory factor analysis for its ability to recognize
distinct loadings on multiple different latent factors within groups of concepts.
Factor analysis permits the arrangement of a collection of variables along latent
factors which stand in for deeper concepts the variables share among one an-
other. I tested for eigenvalues and, in line with the model’s specifications and
with theory, performed the analysis.
 Model A: Logit Model
The results for the first of two logit models are shown below. For this, the stan-
dard logit model, there is both a dot-whisker plot and a predicted probability
graphic for the primary independent variables of interest. This model tested the

various concepts against actual self-reported voting behavior among the respon-
dents who were old enough to vote in the  election.
. Logit Model
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Attitudes Controls
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Figure : Logged Odds of Voting in the  Election
(N = ,, AIC = , BIC ., Log-likelihood -.) This graphic dis-
plays the results of a logistic regression model predicting voting behavior among
respondents aged - at the time of the  election. The ‘whiskers’ represent
confidence intervals at the % margin. A dotted vertical line marks zero, or the
point at which the concept has no impact on voting probability. The variables are
divided based on their theoretical groupings. The intercept has been omitted to
improve readability, but a version with it is available in Appendix B, as is a table
showing model coefficients, standard errors, and other fit statistics.

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Figure : Predicted Effects of ’Alternative’ Behaviors
Pictured above are , times simulated predicted probabilities for the five
major ‘alternative’ political behaviors. Each point is the predicted effect on the
likelihood of voting of the various behaviors. The whiskers are the confidence
intervals at the % and % mark. ‘Other event’ participation is excluded here
due to the vagueness of its question wording and dubious conceptual meaning.
. Discussion
Among the informal political behaviors, paper petition signing and social me-
dia discussion of politics both significantly, positively increased the likelihood of
voting. Meanwhile, participating in boycotts, protests, and signing web-based
petitions were all positively likely, but not enough that they escaped the bounds
of uncertainty. Meanwhile, ‘other’ political event participation had the greatest
magnitude of all, and was the only statistically significant negative result, it’s
presence drastically reducing the likelihood of voting. These results were unex-

pected based on the assumptions set by theory, to say the least. Among the core
concepts of interest, only ‘other’ event participation behaved as anticipated by
theory, and the vague, open nature of its question wording makes interpretation
challenging. Meanwhile, active political discussion on social media and signing
physical petitions both increased the likelihood of voting, despite supposedly
being factors which should crowd voting behavior out.
The additional formal behaviors I included were all significant and, largely,
had greater magnitudes of log-likelihood than did the informal behaviors, though
their error terms were larger due to fewer respondents engaging in them.
Likewise, each of the attitudinal variables was positive and significant, with
the measure of political optimism being noticeably less likely to increase voting
than interest or competence. Nevertheless, all the positive attitudes had a posi-
tive impact on voting, as expected.
Among the control variables, far and away the most actuating (and, indeed,
the single most impactful concept in the model) factor for young voters aged -
 in the  election was whether or not they were African-American. This is
doubtless a strong residual ‘Obama effect,’ as both young and African-American
voters were core demographics Barack Obama’s campaign was able to draw into
the electorate and motivate to turn out and vote. Being white is also positively
and significantly probable with voting behavior, likely due to various socioe-
conomic factors well-trod by previous work on voter turnout. Additionally, as

demonstrated within the literature, education and income are both significant
and positively related to voting, with education in particular greatly increasing
the likelihood of voting. Meanwhile, gender and Hispanic ethnicity both were
insignificant, with gender being narrowly insignificantly negatively related to
voting. Both of these are likely artifacts of the sample or simply do not have a
large impact on voting among this age group. More than half of respondents
were women, so the issue with significance is not due to a lack of respondents.
Ultimately, these results constitute a cautious support for the less expected
Hypothesis B, challenging the predominant body of the literature, and at mini-
mum fail to reject the null hypothesis for Hypothesis A, as only a single, poten-
tially invalid measure of informal political engagement behaved as A predicted
and reduced the chances of voting.

 Model : Ordinal Logit Model
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Figure : Ordinal Logged Odds of Self-Assessed Likelihood of Voting Once 
N = , AIC = ., BIC ., Log-likelihood -..
This graph displays the results of an ordinal logistic regression model predict-
ing underage respondents’ self-assessed likelihood to vote in the future. A table
showing model coefficients and standard errors, as well as the intercept values,
is available in Appendix B. Additionally, a relative risk ratio table of this model
is also available in Appendix B.
. Discussion
Among the core independent variables, this model had only one that was posi-
tively significant, and it was participation in online political groups. Meanwhile,
social media and signing web petitions were both positive but insignificant, and
protest attendance, paper petitions, boycott participation, and ‘other’ event par-
ticipation were all negatively related to voting likelihood, but failed to meet the
standards of significance.

The results for the supplemental formal political behaviors are interesting in
the case of Model . While political merchandise-signs and buttons-increased
chances of reporting likelihood to vote, just as before in Model , the other two
concepts did not align so neatly with expectations. Rally attendance had an in-
significant positive effect on likelihood and, more interestingly, working on po-
litical campaigns significantly reduced the chances of young Americans’ voting.
The possibility that working on political campaigns at a non-voting age could
potentially suppress later voting behavior is a fascinating concept that additional
research should make an effort to explore.
Finally, among the attitudinal variables, all three were positive, with opti-
mism just missing the margin for significance while competence and interest
both met it convincingly. These results most strongly mirror the findings of
Model , and likewise align with expectations.
Among the controls, parental engagement had the greatest likelihood and sig-
nificance, followed by gender, which was not significant at all in Model . The
remaining controls, including the theoretically massive income and education,
had an insignificant effect on the younger respondents’ likelihood of voting. Less
fully through their academic lives and less financially independent, these differ-
ences make sense among the underage respondents.
Interestingly, among both older and younger respondents, though to a greater
extent among the younger respondents, the perception of their parents as polit-

ically engaged had a significant, positive effect on the chances of voting and ex-
pressing a likelihood of voting. The literature rarely focuses on the relationships
between Millennials and their parents, but these results suggest that parental
involvement might represent a potential inroad to improving Millennial voting
behavior. There are also potentially powerful demographic conditions, such as
socioeconomic status, that could have strong effects on the relationship between
children and their parents, and potentially influence the effectiveness of this con-
cept, for better or worse. Future study could investigate this result with a more
intricate survey process focused on both respondents’ and their parents’ political
attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors, and how the two might interact.
As before with the older respondents, the null hypothesis for Hypothesis A
cannot be rejected, and what significant evidence there is provides support for
Hypothesis B, though to a lesser extent in this case compared to the Model .
This again runs against the body of theory suggesting young people pursue al-
ternative behaviors in place of voting behavior, albeit with the caveat that many
of the concepts in this model were negatively related to voting, but lacked the
necessary significance.
 Model : Confirmatory Factor Analysis
I ran a  times simulation of eigenvalues on a model composed of the theoret-
ically formal and informal political behaviors from the Youth and Participatory

Politics dataset, the same as used in the logit models but with the behavioral and
control variables excluded. The results suggested that the ideal configuration for
the factor analysis would be to use two factors, in line with expectations. A scree
plot of the eigenvalues is available in Appendix B. From there, I conducted a con-
firmatory factor analysis on the concepts along two factors, and produced a table
of the loadings.
. Results
Table : Factor Loadings of Formal and In-
formal Behaviors
Factor 1 Factor 2
2010 Vote 0.29
Campaign Work 0.49 -0.36
Rally 0.58 0.26
Sign or Button 0.58 -0.19
Paper Petition 0.53 0.27
Web Petition 0.54 0.40
Social Media 0.56
Online Group 0.55
Boycott 0.39 0.16
Protest 0.44
Other Event 0.49
SS Loadings 2.78 0.50
Proportional Variance 0.25 0.05
Cumulative Variance 0.25 0.30
Table  shows the factor loadings of the formal and informal behaviors in the
model. No values are excluded due to loading size in part to more clearly examine
which direction everything loads regardless of magnitude. Model stats are as

follows: (BIC = ., Tucker-Lewiss Index = ., Adjusted R-Squared = .)
. Discussion
The results of the factor model were, as with the previous model, not what I an-
ticipated. Based on the literature, the variables should have divided if not into
‘formal’ and ‘informal,’ at least into two exclusive mutual alternatives. Instead,
the results demonstrate a substantive lack of substance, failing entirely to sup-
port the relationship that holds so much weight in the literature.
I refrained from labeling the factors in the table as ‘Formal Behavior’ and ‘In-
formal Behavior’ in no small part because voting in the  election rated no
higher than ., and every single other concept in the model had a higher load-
ing than voting on Factor . Likely, Factor  does represent some sort of political
participation, but the specifics are difficult to discern based on the uniformly
high loadings from all concepts and it is almost certainly not a pure ’formal vot-
ing’ factor based on the lower loading of voting behavior. Factor  is equally dif-
ficult to analyze, as it loads negatively on two of the ‘formal’ behaviors–campaign
work and campaign merchandise–and positively on one more of them–rally attendance–
alongside boycotts and the two petition varieties. Ideas similar to the theory are
present, but they are not quite clearly defined enough with these measures and
this model to confidently report a conclusion.
Examining the model statistics helps to explain the problems within the factor

model–Factor  explains % of the variance, but Factor  only adds another %.
Additionally, the Tucker-Lewiss Index score falls markedly short of the ideal .
value for good model fit, at .. Finally, the R-squared value of . suggests
that only % of the behavior of these variables is captured by the factor model,
severely limiting its descriptive power within the larger context of these concepts.
This model, rife with issues and difficult to properly interpret, resoundingly
fails to reject the null hypothesis of Hypothesis . No clear division between for-
mal and informal emerges, and what loadings do appear are sometimes counter-
intuitive, especially in the case of voting behavior. This does not mean it sup-
ports the opposite idea–that there is no division between formal and informal–
but instead that the model, as it stands, cannot adequately prove any conclu-
sive descriptive hypothesis about the case, and if anything suggests that there
is not a divide. Serious additional effort needs to be conducted to try and con-
firm whether or not there is any true validity to this construction, among young
people or otherwise.
 Conclusion
The results of this study are equal parts surprising and somewhat inconclusive,
leading to as many questions as answers. Ultimately, these findings do not sup-
port the theoretical idea that Millennials engage in alternative political behav-
iors in lieu of voting, but instead that, if anything, most political behaviors occur

alongside one another. Moreover, it remains unclear whether the theoretically
based division between formal and informal behaviors is as clear and simple as
the literature would suggest. Additional study is vital to expand understanding
of this phenomenon and clarify the mechanisms and specifics of what informal
behaviors substitute or coexist with certain formal behaviors, and how formal
and informal behaviors are defined and measured.
. Impact on the Theory
The political behavior of the Millennial generation has a great deal of room left
for study, and the results of this exercise, while small, serve to demonstrate as
much. The topic is complex and will require a great deal more study to fully
grasp. Ultimately, while the prevailing body of current theory suggests that Mil-
lennials substitute alternative behaviors such as those tested here, the results this
study seem to call that idea into question. Additional tests and more data will be
necessary to truly make a strong case against the theory, however.
The narrative which emerges based on these findings, while somewhat muddy,
appears to be that, at least with some of these behaviors and among some Mil-
lennials, greater political engagement is not selectively applied but instead dis-
tributed broadly, where signing petitions and engaging on social media coexist
with voting behavior, campaigning, and other political activities. Meanwhile,
among other alternatives, the results suggest that there is little strong relation-

ship between voting behavior and these so-called ‘alternatives,’ and where rela-
tionships do appear, they often seem more likely to be positive than negative.
Within this narrative, the Millennials who are politically distant and disengaged
are just that, while others engage seemingly with everything at once.
These results are noteworthy for what they suggest, but this study is hardly a
final judgment on the ideas I have attempted to broach, and the limitations of this
study should encourage careful, methodical research in the future to attempt to
clarify these theoretical relationships and truly root out how formal and informal
behaviors interact. For my part, I will list this study’s methodological limitations
and weaknesses.
. Limitations and Threats to Validity
This study suggests interesting findings, but it does so from a position which
necessitates those findings be considered cautiously. A number of weaknesses,
from the available data to the methods applied, are considered here.
Firstly, there are the limitations of the data I have used for this study. Impor-
tant theoretical concepts are absent from this dataset, making it fall somewhat
short of the ideal for this study, as is the tendency of secondary data analyses.
Notably, this dataset lacked a variable representing volunteer work, an impor-
tant part of the literature on ’alternative’ behaviors that replace formal ones. The
inclusion of a measure of volunteer efforts alongside these measures would ex-

pand understanding of the substitution narrative, and offer a broader, more valid
perspective on Millennial political participation. Additionally, while the dataset
measured a wealth of behaviors, it was light on attitudes, leaving an incomplete
picture of the political feelings of the respondents, a valuable component of the
theory on why young people disengage from politics.
Just as important as what was asked is who was asked, and while the dataset
was a treasure trove of Millennial-aged respondents, it did not survey anyone
outside the Millennial generation, and no comparable study exists to try and
examine the results in direct contrast to other generations or even the broader
United States. For examining youth behavior directly, the data is great. However,
having subjects from outside the target demographic could provide valuable per-
spective on how and where Millennials differ as well as where they are similar to
older citizens.
An ideal dataset for this study would doubtless be daunting to gather. It
would need to strongly oversample Millennials, but still have a decent sample
of non-Millennials for comparison. It would need to gather an in-depth slew of
information about political behavior, preferably over several election cycles, as
well as political attitudes. Additionally, it would benefit from an added qualita-
tive component, either in the pilot stage or after surveying, to attempt to clarify
the sorts of behaviors which fall under the ’other’ category, and which ones might
be the most significant in affecting voting behavior.

. Future Research
Future study of this topic should take a few lessons from the shortcomings of
this study. First and foremost, a dataset specifically collected to test this body of
theory and to examine the real nature of the formal-informal conceptualization
is sorely needed. Efforts to collect that would greatly advance understanding of
Millennial political behaviors and enhance the validity of the current theoretical
landscape. Particularly worthwhile would be to break down that ’other event’
participation concept, and determine what elements of that question produced
a result so well-aligned with the theory. Unpacking the behaviors caught up in
that question could open new doors for study of what behaviors young people
consider to be ’political’ at all, and greatly advance the theory.
Political participation is more than just the momentary acts of voting, protest-
ing, or signing a petition, however. Among the most meaningful ways to engage
with politics is to enter into it as a politician, and to this end Millennials and
other youth are sorely lacking. An ideal path for study to advance, for me, would
be into a deep consideration of candidate emergence among Millennials. Recent
studies show that many of the same attitudes and much of the same aversion to
politics are magnified when it comes to candidate emergence (Lawless and Fox
). Substantial differences in recruitment of younger candidates only serves
to exacerbate the problem (Kanthak and Woon ). and there is a profound
danger in a young generation that does not enter politics and is left behind.

Millennials are not incurably indisposed to politics, they just have not been
drawn into it in with the same old strategies that worked on previous generations.
Their experiences with politics are fundamentally different, shaping how they
connect with politics. Moreover, Millennials acquire information with different
methods and at much greater speeds than previous generations and process the
information they get differently (Kahne and Middaugh ). Understanding
how and for what reasons Millennials engage with politics is and should remain
a priority of social scientists.

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Appendix A Variables
A. Descriptive Statistics
Table : Model Variable Descriptive Statistics
N Mean SD Min Max Skew Kurtosis SE
Dependent Variables
2010 Vote 2081 0.42 0.49 0 1 0.32 -1.9 0.01
Voting Likelihood 820 3.16 0.86 1 4 -0.98 0.49 0.03
Formal Behaviors
Rally Attendence 2901 0.1 0.3 0 1 2.69 5.25 0.01
Campaign Work 2881 0.05 0.23 0 1 3.95 13.63 0.00
Sign Or Button 2898 0.19 0.39 0 1 1.56 0.45 0.01
Informal Behaviors
Paper Petition 2888 0.19 0.39 0 1 1.59 0.54 0.01
Web Petition 2891 0.18 0.39 0 1 1.64 0.69 0.01
Social Media 2899 0.32 0.47 0 1 0.75 -1.43 0.01
Boycott 2886 0.11 0.31 0 1 2.56 4.54 0.01
Protest 2888 0.06 0.24 0 1 3.58 10.84 0.01
Online Group 2897 0.13 0.34 0 1 2.20 2.83 0.01
Other Event 2895 0.11 0.31 0 1 2.57 4.60 0.01
Attitudes
Competence 2890 2.23 0.85 1 4 0.18 -0.66 0.02
Political Interest 2912 2.29 0.85 1 4 0.19 -0.59 0.02
Optimism 2872 2.34 0.81 1 4 0.03 -0.57 0.02
Controls
Woman 2911 0.56 0.50 0 1 -0.24 -1.94 0.01
White 2920 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.87 -1.25 0.01
Black 2920 0.23 0.42 0 1 1.28 -0.37 0.01
Hispanic 2920 0.27 0.44 0 1 1.03 -0.94 0.01
Political Parents 2886 2.25 0.99 1 4 0.18 -1.08 0.02
Education 2906 5.68 2.30 1 11 -0.31 -0.66 0.04
Income 2737 10.07 4.91 1 19 -0.22 -0.89 0.09

Appendix B Additional Graphics and Tables
B. Additional Model Details
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Figure : Logged Odds of Model Variables and Voting in the  Election, With
Intercept
N = ,. The Logged odds ratios of each variable compared to  voting
behavior are represented, with tails showing their confidence intervals at the %
and % margin. A vertical line demarcates zero. The variables are divided based
on their theoretical groupings.

Table : Logit of Voting in 
Coefficient SE
(Intercept) -4.73∗ 0.42
CampaignWork 0.62∗ 0.30
SignOrButton 0.48∗ 0.16
Rally 0.53∗ 0.22
PaperPetition 0.38∗ 0.15
WebPetition 0.05 0.15
SocialMedia 0.26 0.14
OnlineGroup -0.02 0.19
Protest 0.02 0.24
Boycott 0.11 0.18
OtherEvent -0.63∗ 0.21
Optimism 0.11 0.07
Competence 0.26∗ 0.07
Interest 0.30∗ 0.07
Woman -0.08 0.11
White 0.45∗ 0.16
Black 0.93∗ 0.18
Hispanic 0.02 0.17
Education 0.33∗ 0.04
Income 0.03∗ 0.01
ParentsActive 0.11 0.06
N 1851
AIC 2152.16
BIC 2616.14
logL -992.08
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05

Table : Ordered Logit of Likely Voting
Coefficient SE
(Intercept 1) -0.23 0.49
(Intercept 2) 0.66 0.48
(Intercept 3) 3.10∗ 0.50
CampaignWork -0.50 0.42
SignOrButton 0.50∗ 0.24
Rally 0.18 0.35
PaperPetition -0.11 0.25
WebPetition 0.01 0.25
SocialMedia 0.08 0.19
OnlineGroup 0.49 0.28
Protest -0.07 0.37
Boycott -0.24 0.30
OtherEvent -0.21 0.28
Optimism 0.08 0.09
Competence 0.42∗ 0.10
Interest 0.39∗ 0.10
Woman 0.30∗ 0.15
White 0.45 0.16
Black 0.18 0.25
Hispanic 0.01 0.22
Education -0.04 0.05
Income -0.01 0.02
ParentsActive 0.39∗ 0.09
N 704
AIC 1521.4
BIC 1626.2
logL -737.7
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05

Table : Relative Risk Ratios of Ordered Logit Model
Dependent Variable:
PlanToVote
CampaignWork 0.614(0.417)
SignOrButton 1.648∗(0.244)
Rally 1.193(0.347)
PaperPetition 0.900(0.253)
WebPetition 1.010(0.252)
SocialMedia 1.080(0.188)
OnlineGroup 1.637∗(0.284)
Protest 0.937(0.367)
Boycott 0.783(0.303)
OtherEvent 0.808(0.276)
Pessimism 0.925(0.093)
Competence 1.521∗(0.104)
Interest 1.479∗(0.104)
Woman 1.347∗(0.149)
White 1.136(0.221)
Black 1.199(0.247)
Hispanic 1.004(0.224)
Education 0.958(0.048)
Income 0.987(0.017)
ParentsActive 1.471∗(0.086)
Observations 704
∗p<0.1;
Calculated relative risk ratios of voting and the other variables in the model.
A one unit increase in each coefficient is an multiplicative increase in voting
behavior relative to the listed coefficient. For example, a score of  means the
chances of voting would be  times more likely under the condition listed.

2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
3.
5
Parallel Analysis Scree Plots
Component Number
e
ig
en
 va
lu
es
 o
f p
rin
ci
pa
l c
om
po
ne
nt
s
  PC  Actual Data
  PC  Simulated Data
 PC  Resampled Data
Figure : Scree Plot of Formal and Informal Political Behaviors
Scree plot of the factor model. The eigenvalues demonstrate that, as anticipated,
a -factor model was ideal for the variables selected. As can be seen both here and
in the resulting factor model’s proportional variance values, however, the eigen-
value takes an absolute nosedive after the  factor point, only barely remaining
above  for the  factor margin.

